2024 Year-End Portfolio Review
2024 marked another year of outperformance over relevant benchmarks. My portfolio appreciated 27.6% in 2024, outperforming the S&P 500 by 260 basis points and the Russell 2000 Value Index by almost 20 percentage points. A $1,000 investment at the beginning of 2019 has grown to $5,568 over the past 6 years, resulting in an average compounded return of 33.1% per year. The same investment in the S&P 500 Index and Russell 2000 Value Index would have grown to $2,591 and $1,737, respectively, over the same period.
Is it Luck or is it Skill?
“It’s not whether you’re right or wrong that’s important, but how much money you make when you’re right and how much you lose when you’re wrong” - George Soros
In evaluating an investment manager, most people (myself included) tend to first focus on historical return, particularly relative to a benchmark, as this is the easiest and most accessible measure. It is also the most straightforward way to compare across different managers. “Did you beat the benchmark over the [X period]? Yes or no?” It yields a clear answer without much room for doubt.
However, like with everything else in investing, it’s important to dive deeper and ask not only the what, but also the how. “How were the returns generated?” “How concentrated was the portfolio throughout the period?” “How do you define and manage risk and position sizing?” “How do you structure your investment process?” These are just a few examples of the many potential questions one could ask. Unfortunately, this is where most retail investors, especially those without a finance or investment background, stumble as they generally haven’t studied investing closely enough to discern the good from the bad.
In an attempt to answer the “how” behind the returns, this year I’d like to share a few interesting statistics regarding my investment performance thus far. In the article Dispersion and Alpha Conversion, Michael Mauboussin outlines that there are three ways investors can express investment management skill: market timing, security selection, and position sizing. He goes on in the article to highlight two measures for tracking investing skill:
The batting average (or hit ratio) is the number (i.e., count) of investments that make money as a percentage of total investments made. For instance, if an investor makes 100 decisions in a year and 60 make money, the batting average is 60%. Batting average essentially measures security selection – the ability to find securities that realize returns in excess of a benchmark after adjusting for risk.
The slugging ratio (or win/loss rate) is the average absolute gains for successful investments divided by the average losses for unsuccessful ones (both realized and unrealized). The slugging ratio is a proxy for position sizing, which measures the proficiency to make each investment the appropriate size to earn the highest return possible for an assumed level of risk.
Since evidence suggests that most investors are not skillful at market timing, I’ll focus on security selection and position sizing. In terms of batting average, over the past 6 years, I’ve made a total of 63 distinct investment decisions – 51 in stocks, 6 in ETFs, and 6 in Options. Out of the 63 investments, 41 investments yielded a profit while 22 resulted in a loss, leading to a cumulative batting average of 65%. This is a bit below the benchmark average of >70% for a concentrated equity strategy (see table below) in part due to my poor record in the early years.
As can be seen by the graph below, my batting averages were quite poor in the beginning, as I was still new and just learning the trade. I would find myself buying securities and then selling them a few months later as I realized I didn’t really know much about the company and had no conviction to hold through the drawdowns. Fortunately, given the low conviction, I was smart enough to size positions small. I was disciplined enough to cut losses early, and so the losses were minimal relative to my overall portfolio value. Over time, as I began to improve my research and portfolio management process, my batting average started to increase, going from 25% in 2019 to 73% in 2024. For instance, when I break out my investments between current and past investments, the batting average increases to 77% for current investments (10 out of 13 current investments show a profit) vs. 62% for past/exited investments.
With respect to the slugging ratio, I used a simplified approach of taking the average absolute gains for successful investments and dividing it by the average losses for unsuccessful ones (Mauboussin suggests a more involved approach of comparing the portfolio to an equal-weighted portfolio). Over the same 6-year period beginning in 2019, my slugging ratio came out to 14.6x, which at first glance seems suspiciously high considering the benchmark for a high ratio (venture capital) is >2.5. I think a big driver was my high conviction bet on TPL and the relatively minor losses I incurred whenever I did make an unprofitable investment. Specifically, I initially sized TPL at ~90% and left it to compound for two years before trimming down to ~15-20% in early 2023. As a result, TPL has accounted for ~45% of all profits to date. My top 5 investments – TPL, VNO, PAR, TDW, and TSLA (my only major short where I was very lucky with timing in 2022 and 2023) – have accounted for ~90% of total profits, which goes to validate the truism that typically only a handful of investments will drive the overwhelming majority of one’s return.
It is encouraging to see the positive results generated in recent years (2023 and 2024), as I’ve become more deliberate about position sizing and more thoughtful about diversification and risk management, building a balanced portfolio with exposures to multiple uncorrelated sectors. Going forward, a good test of skill will be to see how the portfolio fares during a broad-based drawdown in the overall market.
Top 5 Holdings (as of YE 2024)
PAR Technology Corp. (PAR)
PAR is currently my largest position at market, comprising ~17% of the portfolio. I began investing in PAR at the beginning of November 2023 at a price of ~$29 per share and subsequently grew the position over the ensuing 6 months into a core holding comprising ~10% of the portfolio at cost. My current average cost basis is ~$34 per share.
I first came across PAR through an investor letter by Scott Miller at Greenhaven Road Capital, one of the few skilled managers that I follow closely. Greenhaven Road initially invested in PAR in 2019 and by 2023, PAR was the single largest investment in the fund’s portfolio at over 20%. Seeing such a high level of conviction from a manager raised my interest to dig in, but what piqued my curiosity further was to see multiple other sophisticated managers also involved, namely ADW Capital and Voss Capital.
The decision to invest in PAR was multifaceted but relatively straightforward. Since much ink has already been spilled on PAR’s thesis (for those interested, please see past Greenhaven Road Capital letters and Voss Capital Substack post), I’ll primarily focus on a few aspects that stood out to me the most.
First and perhaps the most important factor was the company’s management. PAR’s CEO Savneet Singh has proven to be a very effective leader and capital allocator. With previous experience of successfully founding and running a precious metals digital platform (GBI), a holding company focused on niche software businesses (Tera Holdings Inc.), and a partner at CoVenture, Savneet appeared to be both a shrewd operator and investor. Podcast interviews and his personal blog articles suggested that he’s a devoted student of both Warren Buffett and Mark Leonard of Constellation Software, which is always a plus. But what was more impressive was what he’s been able to accomplish in a span of just 5 short years as CEO, including:
Completely transforming a stagnant company culture with low morale and unclear focus and ownership into one laser-focused on excellence, innovation, and ROIC instead of revenues
Growing ARR by 22x (from $11M to $248M) through a combination of shrewd strategic acquisitions and robust organic growth
Growing the product portfolio from two solutions (POS and Back Office) to six (added Payments, Loyalty, Digital Ordering, and Retail), all best-in-class offerings that have fortified PAR’s unified platform / one-stop-shop vendor approach
Increasing subscription service gross margins by 1.5x by clearing the big technical debt burden associated with Brink and offshoring developers and engineers to lower-cost countries such as Poland, Serbia, and India
Divesting the government business for $102 million, finally turning PAR into a pure-play enterprise hospitality technology company
Securing the largest and most transformative deal in company history with the exclusive partnership with Burger King (for Brink and MENU) in North America
Another crucial factor for investment was PAR’s relatively weak competitive landscape. The company only has two main competitors in its core enterprise restaurant business – Oracle (Micros) and NCR Voyix (Aloha). Although they both command a much larger market share of over 100,000 locations each (vs. PAR’s ~33k in the Operator Cloud segment), I believe their incumbency, conglomerate nature, and diversified focus has been a big disadvantage in the rapidly changing market of enterprise restaurants. On the other hand, PAR’s smaller size and singular focus has allowed it to be more nimble and invest more heavily into R&D and product innovation. Given recent major wins including Burger King and Wendy’s, PAR has demonstrated its ability to outcompete the sleepy incumbents and, now with its completed acquisition of TASK, is poised to continue to take share with its superior products and increased competitiveness in international markets.
Lastly, when you step back and think about the underlying problem that PAR solves, the value proposition becomes very clear and powerful. The fundamental problem is restaurants today – whether it’s large Tier 1 enterprise QSR chains or small, independent full-service establishments – suffer either from 1) unwieldy/unsustainably complex tech stack requiring management of hundreds of single product solutions (“vendor spaghetti”) or 2) costly maintenance of complex internally built software or 3) a combination of both 1 and 2. PAR solves this huge problem by offering a unified platform of best-in-class products that work better together than in isolation, creating a simple integrated solution for customers. By offering multi-product, multi-module solutions that connect and share data seamlessly across systems, PAR not only reduces costs and simplifies IT operations for customers, but it also enables them to grow and scale their businesses to better serve their own retail customers and win share in the market. And as an added bonus, winning customers with not just one but multiple highly sticky, mission-critical software solutions likely amplifies switching costs not just linearly but exponentially.
Vornado Realty Trust (VNO)
My second largest holding currently is VNO at ~11% of the portfolio. The thesis for VNO has played out better, and quite a bit faster, than I originally expected. With an average cost basis of ~$14 per share and an initial weight at cost of 10%, my investment in VNO has been one of my most successful investments to date with a total return of 198% and an MOIC of ~3x over a 1.5 year horizon. The stock price is currently trading in the low 40s range, which is closer to the low-end of my intrinsic value range estimate of $55 to $80 per share. The low hanging fruit for excess returns is now gone, but there is still upside left given current fundamentals.
So what has transpired over the past year and a half? First, there has been a complete 180 narrative shift in the office market. Most companies, particularly Big Tech, have gone from fully remote or flexible work policies to a more moderate hybrid model of 3 days a week, with some high-profile companies like Amazon mandating back to 5 days in the office by the beginning of 2025. According to Placer.ai, which uses cell phone data to track trends, office visitations in New York in October were at 86.2% relative to 2019 levels, higher than in any other city in the country. What many feared may be an L-shaped recovery in office demand is turning out to be closer to a V-shaped recovery.
In tandem with the return to office (RTO), the other major trend that has persisted is the flight to quality trend. Tenants have continued to flock towards higher quality, well-amenitized office buildings, particularly those near transit hubs, to coax employees back into the office. This has disproportionately benefited high-quality players like VNO, particularly with its prime PENN 1 and PENN 2 assets in the PENN District.
To put some numbers behind this, according to CBRE, YTD leasing volume in Manhattan is up 29% from the prior year, with Q3 2024 marking the strongest quarter of leasing since Q4 2019 and Class A capturing an outsized share of the overall activity. For VNO, this year has been even more robust. In fact, management expects to sign somewhere between 3.5 and 3.8 million SF in 2024, making it the second highest leasing volume year in company history. Granted, this year is somewhat skewed by two mega-deals – ~1 million SF Bloomberg HQ renewal at 731 Lexington Ave and 1.1 million SF master lease deal with NYU for the entire office component of 770 Broadway – but the robust leasing pipeline and level of interest from existing and new tenants has made management more confident and enthusiastic about future prospects than they have been in years.
Not to be outdone by the office segment, VNO’s high street retail business also exceeded expectations. Vacancy rates are now below pre-pandemic 2019 levels in most Manhattan submarkets and retail leasing activity has picked up meaningfully in the last couple of quarters with almost all assets seeing significant interest. The major highlight over the past year has been the increasing trend of major retailers acquiring prime real estate on Fifth Avenue to secure their presence for the long-term. The starting gun was fired back in December 2023, when Prada acquired two buildings, 720 and 724 Fifth Avenue, for $835 million. Shortly after, Gucci acquired 717 Fifth Avenue for $963 million. These two blockbuster deals shook the retail market and raised questions around whether the deals were one-time anomalies, and thus not indicative of what VNO’s Fifth Avenue assets may be worth, or a sign of a broader strategy shift for major retailers. The answer came soon enough in Q2 2024 when VNO sold UNIQLO’s Fifth Avenue flagship retail space at 666 Fifth Avenue to the retailer for a whopping $350 million. The sale was a notable win for the company as it represented a 4.2% cap rate on in-place NOI, comparable to the previous record set in 2019 when VNO achieved a 4.5% cap rate as part of the asset recapitalization for the Fifth Avenue/Times Square retail JV. More importantly, in connection with the UNIQLO sale and a separate 1535 Broadway transaction, VNO was able to monetize half of its ~$1.8 billion preferred equity interest in the retail JV at par value – a surprise to many sell-side analysts as the preferred interest was believed to be substantially below par only a few quarters ago.
Looking ahead, the medium-term thesis for VNO is two-fold: 1) inflection in earnings driven by the lease-up of PENN District assets, increase in occupancy for broader NYC office assets, and increase in rental rates as supply continues to tighten; and 2) value accretion from debt to equity as the company continues to de-lever the balance sheet. With respect to #2, VNO is expected to pay off ~$1.1 billion in debt in the next couple of quarters – all else equal, this action alone should provide a low-to-mid teens return upside to the stock.
Regarding #1, aside from the general recovery from RTO and flight to quality, the other major tailwind is the favorable demand-supply landscape. There has been no new supply over the past 5 years and current costs for construction and capital continue to make it virtually impossible to build. As NYC real estate history has shown time and again, every great bull market for landlords followed a period of constrained supply.
As context, according to management, the total size of the NYC office market is roughly 400 million SF of office space, of which between 100 and 150 million SF is considered obsolete or irrelevant inventory that will evaporate over time. Out of the remaining relevant supply of 250 to 300 million SF, only about 180 to 200 million is competitive with VNO, comprising the higher quality, Class A buildings. VNO controls ~17.5 million SF of office space in NYC, so about 10% of the inventory.
Hagerty (HGTY)
I’ve owned Hagerty for about two years now, having bought my first shares in January 2023 at around $9 per share. Since I published a detailed article on the company back in July, I’ll keep my update brief. Over the past two years, Hagerty has achieved significant progress across virtually all facets of the business. Accelerated revenue growth – driven by robust written premium growth, higher quota share for Hagerty Re, and Marketplace business expansion – combined with tight cost discipline and operational efficiencies has resulted in a significant inflection in underlying operating earnings (see summary table below). The Hagerty value proposition continues to resonate deeply with the collector car world, as seen not only by steady increases in new business count year after year, but also in the persistently high customer NPS scores and policy retention rates.
All this underlying business improvement hasn’t been reflected in the price of the stock. Perhaps the muted share price growth has been a function of the business catching up to the priced-in expectations as well as low liquidity given high insider ownership. However, looking forward, with the State Farm rollout ramping up in earnest in 2025, the launch of the New Enthusiast Plus program, and the continued Marketplace build-out, I see a path for operating earnings to climb to over $300 million in 2-3 years. With a current enterprise value of ~$3.5 billion, Mr. Market is offering investors a unique opportunity to buy into a highly advantaged business with superior unit economics (25-40% incremental ROICs), a long growth runway (~5% market share today), and an aligned, laser-focused management team – all for an attractive price that is effectively a low teens P/E multiple on earnings a couple of years down the line.
Texas Pacific Land Corp. (TPL)
I’ve owned TPL for a little over 4 years now, having bought my first shares in September 2020. With an average cost basis of $189 per share, TPL has delivered a total return of 485% (51% annualized) and an MOIC of 5.8x. Although I’ve trimmed the position periodically over the holding period – first in early January 2023 and more recently in November – TPL still represents ~10% of my portfolio today. In hindsight, I would have certainly done much better from a returns standpoint by just holding on to all my shares. However, my diversification into other opportunities has been crucial for my growth as an investor as it has broadened my circle of competence and allowed me to manage risk exposures more thoughtfully.
TPL is one of the very few companies in my portfolio that I would characterize as a permanent holding. In a world with ever-growing budget deficits, government debt, and monetary supply, it’s crucial to own assets that can insulate the portfolio from elevated inflation risk. With TPL, I’m implicitly making a bet on a few themes: 1) growing strategic importance and value of Permian Basin oil to the US and West at large; 2) increased oil and gas production from the core Northern Delaware subregion of the Permian Basin where much of TPL’s surface and royalty interests are concentrated; 3) higher water sales and produced water volumes due to high water cuts and TPL’s growing water business; and 4) structurally higher oil prices due to rising labor, raw materials, and input costs. Among the available opportunity set of inflation beneficiary investments, very few can match the cash flow quality, high margin profile, low capital intensity, appreciation potential, and perhaps most importantly, the long-duration and durability of TPL and other land and royalty-based companies.
In the coming months, I plan to dedicate a full article on TPL and LandBridge (a new position) to properly review the current thesis and recent important developments including the rapidly growing water segment and the potentially huge opportunity with AI data center build-out in the Permian Basin.
Tidewater (TDW)
Tidewater has been a core holding in the portfolio for just over two years now. With an average cost basis of $35 per share, TDW has delivered a cumulative return of 54%, or an average return of 23% per year. Though certainly not a shabby return by any means, I’ve actually been involved with TDW for closer to 4 years now, having bought my first shares in the $8-10 range. Like TPL, in hindsight, if I had simply bought and held firm instead of diversifying into other opportunities in pursuit of a higher absolute CAGR, I would have realized a better investment outcome, with fewer taxes and probably fewer headaches. Alas, that is both the beauty and the challenge of the game and only time will tell if my interim sales were truly mistakes or prudent decisions.
So how has the thesis for TDW evolved over the past 2 years? Since my post in December 2022, both the business and the macro landscape for offshore has developed better than I expected. TDW has increased average vessel day rates from ~$13,000 to ~$21,000 per day, an average of over $4,000 per year – an astounding feat, especially considering that past bull cycles saw annual increases in day rates of only $1,500. In Q1 2023, the company acquired 37 high-spec PSVs from Solstad Offshore for $577 million, further growing and improving the quality of its fleet with young, high-spec vessels that typically receive stronger demand and higher day rates than other vessel classes. The vessels had significant cash flow upside potential from future contract rollovers onto market day rates. The acquisition price implied an attractive per-vessel cost of ~$15 million, well below replacement cost of ~$30-65 million for a new vessel (wide range depends on Chinese vs. European shipyards).
Average total fleet utilization has also increased from 75% to 79%. Given the inherent operating leverage in the business, vessel operating margins expanded by 9 percentage points from 38% to 47%, leading adjusted EBITDA to grow fourfold from $132 million to $552 million, and FCF to go from roughly breakeven to $285 million.
Now over the past 12 months, there’s been quite a bit of volatility in the stock price, as shares went from $70 at the beginning of the year to over $100 during the summer, before collapsing over 50% to the current mid-50s range. The decline was tied to a broader sector sell-off, as many drillers like RIG, NE, and VAL also declined by 25% to 50%. I believe the sell-off has been driven by a combination of factors:
Spot oil price declining from over $80 per barrel to the low $70s range, increasing uncertainty for future prices. Although the market tends to fixate on the spot price, the 5-year Brent forward price, which I believe to be the more relevant benchmark given the long-cycle nature of offshore production, is around ~$70 per barrel – a level at which more than 90% of undeveloped offshore reserves are expected to be profitable.
The increased scope, scale, and duration of offshore projects is leading to longer planning and approval periods, thereby causing deferrals of drilling campaigns and offshore activity. Given the sheer size of some of these offshore development projects (tens of billions in spending for decades of production), as well as increasing scarcity of rigs and offshore vessels (some rigs are getting contracted for 2 to 3 years out), it’s natural for decisions to take longer to unfold.
Related to #2, another driver of deferrals is the availability of production equipment, particularly FPSOs. Naturally, operators won’t initiate new exploration or drilling campaigns unless they have the necessary infrastructure to support production. There’s some uncertainty around when these supply chain issues will ease, but most drillers and industry participants believe demand will rebound in the latter half of 2025 and into 2026 and beyond.
These factors notwithstanding, I believe the acute selling in recent months has been overdone and is characteristic of the increasingly short-term nature of markets today. The underlying long-term demand for offshore remains robust as oil companies are still committed to growing their offshore production, especially in light of the superior economics, lower carbon intensity, and longer duration productivity. Importantly, despite the rapid increase in market day rates, new supply continues to be negligible as a percentage of current global fleets, for both OSVs and the drillers, providing ample runway for continued growth in rates, utilization, and earnings power. 2025 will likely be a flattish year in terms of demand and earnings growth, but given announced spending plans for 2026 and beyond, I believe investors willing to hold firm over the next couple quarters will be well-rewarded in due course.
Outlook
Last year, I referenced the Buffett Indicator to provide a general sense of where equity markets were trading relative to long-term history. Here’s the updated chart:
Over the past year, the ratio has increased from 171.5% to 205.6%, surpassing the all-time 193% record set in November 2021. By almost any relevant measure, current equity market valuation levels are the highest they’ve been at any point throughout history. As a few prominent investors like Jeremy Grantham, Howard Marks, and Murray Stahl have observed, the current market bubble is by far the greatest bubble in all of financial history.
In order for the ratio to revert back to the long-term mean, one of two things needs to happen – either equity values must come down (quite a bit) or GDP needs to grow at a very rapid pace. For example, if we assumed that the total value of the Wilshire 5000 stayed constant and GDP somehow accelerated to 10% per year, it would take about a decade for the ratio to decline to the long-term mean range of ~85%. Conversely, if we were to keep GDP constant, the Wilshire 5000 would have to decline by close to 60% to arrive in the same range. As optimistic as I am about the revolutionary power of AI and the potential productivity gains that it could unleash, I’m going to have to lean towards the first scenario as the more likely path for the future.
Here’s my not-so-hot take on where I think we’re going. First, at some point in the future, we may see a big rotation out of the technology sector and into international equities (perhaps Europe and Japan), energy and mining sectors, and smaller-cap companies – i.e., areas of the market that offer better value currently relative to history. Given the increasing competition from China, rising capital intensity due to AI and data center investment (and related margin pressures), and natural constraints to growth from absolute scale, there’s an elevated risk of potential earnings disappointments, particularly given the near-perfect forward-looking expectations implied by the market multiples. With ~34% of the S&P 500 concentrated in just the Magnificent 7 stocks, and certainly an even higher percentage once you include companies that are direct beneficiaries of the Mag-7 ecosystems, I don’t believe there’s ever been a time in history where indices have been this concentrated in one sector of the economy. Such a concentration is unlikely to be sustained in the long-term and is thus especially vulnerable for a reversion to the mean.
Second, I think inflation will rear its ugly head again. With growing budget deficits, geopolitical tensions, government debt and money supply, and increasing scarcity of resources (oil, critical metals, and labor), there’s a good probability that inflation will spike again, or perhaps settle at a higher level, which in turn will pressure corporate earnings and valuations.
And lastly, there’s crypto. Although I don’t have a strong view, or understanding for that matter, of crypto, I think it’s safe to at least assume that Bitcoin is here to stay and will remain as a global asset class that will compete for capital against broader equities and fixed income. The more capital flows into crypto, the less there is left for stocks and bonds.
In light of this worldview, my approach to protect capital has been to focus on companies with the following key traits (non-exhaustive):
Smaller capitalization companies (generally less than $10 billion market cap)
Real asset / hard asset companies (i.e., companies with assets whose value is tied to physical properties such as commodities and real estate) that have increasing scarcity value
Inflation beneficiary companies or companies with strong pricing power that allows them to grow revenues at a faster rate than expenses
Companies with identifiable competitive advantages AND a management team skilled at capital allocation
This is all, of course, just my opinion. I’ll likely be proven horribly wrong on all counts but given my bottom-up, fundamental approach to stocks investing, I’m optimistic that the companies I’ve chosen to own will continue to build value year in and year out and outperform over the next 3-5 years.
Update on JOVI and Personal Journey
To close out this year-end post, I wanted to share a few quick personal updates. First, I began my MBA program at Columbia Business School this past September. Attending CBS has been a goal of mine ever since the summer of 2017, when I first (barely) read through Security Analysis by Ben Graham and fully dove into the world of value investing. It’s been an incredibly rewarding (and intensive) journey thus far, and I’m excited for what’s to come. Unfortunately, given the heavy workload, it’s been a bit more challenging to find the time to publish articles on Substack and pursue new ideas I find of interest. I’ll try to continue to share new ideas and write ups as I go along, but I wanted to provide a bit of context for any future protracted periods of silence.
Second, I wanted to thank all the new subscribers that have come onboard to JOVI. I started 2024 with a whopping 59 subscribers (a good half of which were probably my aunts and some random bots). Today, JOVI has grown to a healthy 430+ subscribers (and growing every day) and I’m both happy and grateful that all of you have found some value in my musings. It’s been quite a fun side project to work on for these past few years and I’m curious to see how the blog will progress over the coming years. If you are interested in getting in touch, please feel free to reach me at logiacapital@gmail.com or message me on X @nmtuan_14. I’m always interested in connecting with fellow investors to talk about ideas and markets.
With that, I wish you all a Happy New Year and may 2025 bring you plenty of alpha!
As usual, none of this is to be construed as investment advice. Please always do your own due diligence before investing.
Well written article as always Tuan and it's neat to see how you've built your portfolio in non-correlated industries (tech, real estate, energy, etc.) and in small cap. If the stock market bubble bursts, it seems like PAR will get hit less in a big tech drawdown as it is more under the radar.
It'll be interesting to see how the offshore sector in particular performs in 2025 and that is a good point you made on the announced spending plans for 2026, so possible tailwinds coming. Thoughts on a potential Transocean and Seadrill merger being heavy dilutive to RIG shareholders?
Also congratulations on starting business school !!
Great recap and well written summaries of all your top holdings. Congrats on your performance and wish you well in your B school adventures. Chuc mung nam moi~